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Teachers' Tort Liability
Thomas A. Dugan*
T HE RECENT NOTORIETY in the Cleveland area attendant upon
several reports of alleged batteries committed by teachers
has served to focus the attention of both the educator and the
citizen on this aspect of liability. This attention may well result
in some necessary judicial and legislative clarification in this
area, but it may tend to obscure other equally important facets
of the teacher's tort liability. It is with this thought in mind that
this article is written. The article itself is intended as much for
teachers as it is for attorneys. Where possible, it attempts to
transcend the attorney's usual interest in event which have al-
ready occurred and seeks to present rules for guidance.
Before liability is discussed, reference must be made to a
particularly vexing problem. In Ohio, actions for negligent torts
must be commenced within two years, and actions for intentional
torts must be commenced within one year of the tort. However,
if the injured person is a minor, these periods do not begin to
run until majority is reached.1 The problem is obvious: the law-
suit may not be filed for five, ten, or even fifteen years. Time
has a corrosive effect on the human memory, and a teacher will
probably find that his recollection of the incident which is the
subject of the lawsuit is, to say the least, vague. Then, too, the
teacher's witnesses, usually students, will undoubtedly have
completely forgotten the incident.
The solution to this problem of the Statute of Limitations
is not an easy one. It would, of course, be possible for the Ohio
General Assembly to do as certain other state legislatures have
done and to remove this protection from minors. To press for
such a solution would be a time-consuming alternative, and such
legislation, unless limited, might well destroy minors' substantial
rights in other areas of the law. The fact is that the minor's at-
torney faces a problem similar to that of the teacher, and one
finds that the claims are nearly always brought to suit within the
one or two year period.
The teacher can protect himself from the damaging effect of
delay by immediately preserving all available evidence. If pos-
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sible, some other school official should assist in the investigation;
this would ensure the teacher of having at least one adult wit-
ness. The investigation should produce detailed statements from
all witnesses and, if possible, from the injured child himself.
Professional investigators prefer to use a stenographer in order
to preserve the statement in the precise language of the inter-
rogator and the witness, but if this is not feasible, a signed
narrative statement will afford some protection. A lapse of sev-
eral years may find a particular area or condition completely
changed, and thus it may be desirable to take some photographs.
Finally, the teacher should record his own recollections and ob-
servations as fully as possible. This investigative material should
then be collected in one file and preserved for future use.
Turning now to the question of liability, it has been found
convenient to discuss the subject of negligent torts separate from
that of intentional torts. The word "teacher" will be used in its
broad sense to include all certificated personnel.
Negligent Torts
The first point to note is that, under the present law of Ohio,
the school itself is immune from liability.2 This raises the inter-
esting question whether a teacher, acting in his capacity as such,
does not also share the school's immunity. The question has not
been decided or discussed by the Ohio courts, but dictum in one
Ohio case is to the effect that a teacher is not immune.3 When
the question of the individual liability of public officers other
than teachers has come before the Ohio courts, it has been held
in a number of instances that such officers are immune.4
Leaving aside the question of immunity, a person is liable
for his own negligent torts and, in addition, may be held liable
for the torts of others on the principle of respondeat superior.
Thus, a teacher who sends a pupil on a personal errand, as op-
posed to an official errand,5 could be held liable for the pupil's
tort in, for example, striking someone with his bicycle.
2 48 Ohio Jur. 2d, Schools § 238 et seq. With respect to private schools,
see Matthews v. Wittenberg College, 113 Ohio App. 387, 178 N. E. 2d 526
(1960).
3 65 Ohio App. 163, 29 N. E. 2d 444 (1940).
4 Thomas v. Wilton, 40 Ohio St. 516 (1884); Ramsey v. Riley, 13 Ohio 157;
State ex Bolen Construction Co. v. Department of Highways, 15 Ohio L.
Abs. 630 (Ct. App. 1933), aff'd 127 Ohio St. 587, 190 N. E. 246 (1934).
5 A teacher who delegates school business to a child would appear to be
acting as a superior servant, not as a principal.
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The cases which discuss a teacher's liability for his own
negligent acts may be arbitrarily subdivided into three general
categories: (1) failure to supervise; (2) failure to use good judg-
ment; and (3) failure to instruct. There have been surprisingly
few Ohio decisions dealing with the liability of teachers, and so
liberal use must be made of out-of-state authorities.
The only reported Ohio decision dealing with a teacher's
liability for his conduct in the classroom, Guyten v. Rhodes, 6 fits
within the first category, a failure to supervise. The case was
decided on the teacher's demurrer, supposedly after the plain-
tiff's attorney had pleaded even those allegations about which
he might be hard-pressed to present evidence. The petition al-
leged that the defendant, the teacher of a class of defective and
incorrigible youths, left the class unattended in order to gossip
with another teacher. While the teacher was absent, a seventeen
year old boy threw a milk bottle which struck a twelve year
old boy in the eye. It was alleged that the teacher knew the
seventeen year old boy had previously assaulted the plaintiff.
The Hamilton County Court of Appeals absolved the teacher
from liability on the theory that his action was not a proximate
cause of the plaintiff's injury.
It may be that the decisive action by the court in the Guyten
case has discouraged the filing of similar cases. The rule enunci-
ated by the court seems to be a sound one, and one which is
fairly easy of application. However, it should be noted that the
petition in that case did not specify how long the teacher was
absent from the room. The court may have felt that, since the
same incident could have occurred if the teacher had merely
turned his back momentarily, a short absence could not possibly
have contributed to cause the unfortunate accident. The ques-
tion remains as to what action the court would have taken if
the petition had alleged that the teacher was absent for, as an
example, one-half hour. Such a prolonged absence might dic-
tate a different result.
Other teachers charged with a failure to supervise have not
fared as well as did the teacher in the Guyten case. In what
seems to be a harsh application of the rule, the New York Court
of Appeals has held that a teacher who attempted to supervise
the noon recess activities from the building might be held liable
to a child who was injured in a portion of the playground which
6 Supra, n. 3.
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was not observable from the teacher's window.7 Liability seems
clearer in another New York case in which a principal failed to
place anyone in charge of young children while they waited for
the school bus following dismissal; one of the children, in scuf-
fling, was pushed into the path of a bicycle, whereby he sustained
certain injuries.'
A teacher who wishes to safeguard himself from this type of
suit would do well to emulate the foresight of the school principal
in the case of Thompson v. Board of Education.9 The plaintiff in
that case was injured when another pupil pushed her on the
stairs. In dismissing the complaint, the New York Court of
Appeals referred to eighteen different means the principal had
taken to fulfill his supervisory duties.
There are no reported Ohio cases in the second subdivision,
failure to use good judgment. What might be considered the
typical example of this type of conduct was at issue in the North
Carolina case of Drum v. Miller.'0 In order to attract a pupil's
attention, the teacher threw a pencil at him; the pupil turned at
the wrong moment, and the pencil struck him in the eye. The
court held that a jury question was presented as to whether the
teacher had acted as a reasonably prudent person. Liability has
also been imposed upon a teacher for sending a young girl to
tend a fire 1' and for approving the use of electric current as part
of an initiation.' 2 Into the same category fall the cases involving
teachers who fail to render emergency medical treatment when
it is necessary or who, when no real emergency exists, take it
upon themselves to act as doctor and nurse.
13
Scant sympathy can be mustered for the teacher who throws
a pencil to attract attention or who approves of the use of elec-
tric current during an initiation. However, the teacher who
must decide whether a pupil is really too sick to participate in
the day's gym class or who must establish the policy insofar as
fifth graders serving on the safety patrol is faced with a dilemma.
7 Miller v. Board of Education, 291 N. Y. 25, 50 N. E. 2d 529 (1943).
8 Selleck v. Board of Education, 276 App. Div. 263, 94 N. Y. S. 2d 318 (1949).
9 280 N. Y. 92, 19 N. E. 2d 796 (1939).
10 135 N. C. 204, 47 S. E. 421 (1904).
11 Smith v. Martin, 2 K. B. 775 (1911).
12 DeGooyer v. Harkness, 70 S. D. 26, 13 N. W. 2d 815 (1944).
13 For example, in Guerrieri v. Tyson, 147 Pa. Super. 239, 24 A. 2d 468
(1942), a teacher attempted to treat a pupil's infected finger by holding it
in boiling water for ten minutes.
4https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol11/iss3/12
11 CLEV-MAR. L. R. (3)
There are some alternatives which are obviously proper, such as
using an average seventh grade boy on the safety patrol, and
some which are obviously improper. 14 But the numberless "in-
between" areas present questions for the resolution of a jury,
and a teacher can only hope that, after mature consideration, he
has adopted the right course. When time permits, consultation
with fellow teachers prior to arriving at a decision is a sign of
mature consideration.
There are no reported Ohio decisions in the final category,
failure to instruct, but the citation of certain out-of-state authori-
ties will serve to point up the problem. In a New York case a
physical education instructor placed two untrained boys in a
boxing ring and let them "slug it out;" the court held that he
failed in his duty as a teacher because he should have warned
and instructed the boys in the art of boxing prior to allowing
them to enter the ring alone. 15
A good example of an instructor who had adequately ful-
filled his duty is furnished by the manual training instructor in
the case of Meyer v. Board of Education.16 In that case a sixteen
year old boy was injured when a classmate turned on a power
saw which the plaintiff was cleaning. In holding for the teacher
as a matter of law, the court noted that he had established and
promulgated rules whereby no one was to turn on a machine
until he was satisfied that it was clear, no one was to turn on a
machine when anyone else was in the immediate area, and only
one boy was to work on any machine at a time.
Before leaving the subject of negligent torts, reference
should be made to one interesting Ohio decision, Casper v. Hig-
gins.17 The plaintiff in that case, a student at Miami University,
was injured while returning from a debate in which he had par-
ticipated as part of a course in public speaking. At the time of
the accident, the plaintiff was in an automobile driven by the
defendant instructor, whose duties included directing the pub-
lic speaking course. The guest statute was raised as a defense.
The student sought to avoid the effect of the statute by arguing
14 One of the Cleveland high schools reportedly sends a girl student on
public transportation to pick up the weekly student passes for the entire
school. While the girl carries no money, she does carry several hundred
dollars of very salable merchandise. This exposure of the girl seems im-
proper.
15 LaValley v. Stanford, 272 App. Div. 183, 70 N. Y. S. 2d 460 (1947).
16 9 N. J. 46, 86 A. 2d 761 (1952).
17 54 Ohio App. 21, 6 N. E. 2d 3 (1935).
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that, since his tuition had been partly used to compensate the
instructor, he was a paying passenger. The Butler County Court
of Appeals rejected this argument and held that the payment of
tuition was too indirect to constitute payment for the trip.
Several recent Ohio cases have held that indirect benefits
will suffice to take a case out of the ambit of the guest statute,"8
and it may be questioned whether the Casper case represents the
present law of Ohio. Liability has been imposed upon school bus
drivers without regard to the guest statute,19 and an argument
could be made that the two situations are analogous. A teacher
who finds it necessary to drive students to and from school
events might be able to protect himself from liability by an ante-
cedent release, but the only real security is in having liability
insurance. It was probably in recognition of this that the Ohio
General Assembly recently enacted legislation which permits
school boards to procure liability insurance insuring employees
for liability occasioned by the operation of a motor vehicle owned
or operated by the school district.2 0
Intentional Torts
When one thinks of an intentional tort in connection with a
teacher, he thinks of assault and battery. But there are two
other torts which may likewise be connected with a teacher's
work-false imprisonment and illegal search and seizure.
The Cleveland newspapers have recently reported on a num-
ber of lawsuits and threatened lawsuits arising out of alleged
batteries by teachers. Yet there are no reported Ohio civil cases
enunciating the applicable rule of law. The court in the Guyten
case, 2 1 as dictum, obscurely referred to the right of a teacher,
within certain undefined limits, to discipline pupils; however, the
court then stated that a teacher could be held civilly liable for an
assault or unreasonable corporal punishment.
The Ohio rule insofar as criminal responsibility for an assault
and battery has been established. As stated by the court in the
case of State v. Lutz, 22 it is that a verdict should be directed for
the defendant unless (1) the punishment was severe or exces-
18 Burrow v. Porterfield, 171 Ohio St. 28 (1960); Lisner v. Faust, 168 Ohio
St. 346, 155 N. E. 2d 59 (1958).
19 Dickerhoof v. Bair, 54 Ohio App. 320, 6 N. E. 2d 990 (1936).
20 Ohio Rev. Code § 3313.201, eff. August 19, 1959.
21 Supra, n. 3.
22 65 Ohio L. Abs. 402, 113 N. E. 2d 757 (C. P. 1953).
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sive, and (2) there either was malice on the part of the teacher 28
or was the production or threat of permanent injury.2 4 The pupil
in that case had been paddled six to fifteen times (the pupil's
version being that it was fifteen times) and had bruises which
disappeared after five days; the court directed a verdict for the
defendant.
In a recent unreported civil case, Judge Brennan of the
Cleveland Municipal Court applied the rule of the criminal cases
and directed a verdict for the teacher.25 The fourteen year old
plaintiff had been warned on two occasions to stop talking.
Finally, the teacher instructed the boy to do exercises, in lieu
of being paddled. The plaintiff did a few exercises and then
stopped. True to his word, the teacher struck him once with a
ruler; this caused a welt which remained for a few days.
Such a decision, fitting as it does within Ohio's criminal
rule, seems to be a sensible approach to the problem of school
discipline. A teacher who did not dare to touch a pupil to punish
him or to stop a disturbance would exist in a jungle. In states
which do not adopt a rule like that of the Lutz case, it is neces-
sary to examine several factors in arriving at a decision: (1) the
nature of the offense; (2) the motive of the pupil; (3) the in-
fluence of his example; (4) the age, sex, mental and physical
condition of the pupil.26 The resolution of these circumstances
is typically a jury function, which, unfortunately, can oftentimes
result in the imposition of liability on a well-meaning teacher.
An interesting question is raised when the battery is commit-
ted in punishing the student for an act which occurred away
from the school premises. In the Lutz case,27 the pupil had
thrown a stone at another pupil who was on her way to school;
the court held that the teacher's responsibility attaches from
the time the child leaves home and continues until the child
returns home. This rule can, of course, be carried to unreason-
23 The court states that the malice may be express or implied. Implied
malice is defined by it as a wrongful act, done wantonly, without just cause
or excuse.
24 An earlier decision, Martin v. State, 11 Ohio N. P. (n.s.) 183 (1910),
aff'd, 87 Ohio St. 459, 102 N. E. 1132 (1912), states that there must be both
malice and production or threat of permanent injury.
25 Poole v. Young, Cleveland Municipal Court No. A613952 (unreported,
1962).
26 Restatement, Torts § 150. See also, Quinn v. Nolan, 7 Ohio Dec. Rep. 585
(1879).
27 Supra, n. 22.
Sept., 1962
7Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1962
TEACHERS'TORTS
able extremes, as in one case in which the pupil had gone home
and then, while standing on his mother's property, abused two
girls who were en route home from school.28 While such a hold-
ing could be justified if the incident took place on a school bus
or at a school outing, it seems unnecessary and extreme to say
that a teacher can punish for misconduct occurring anywhere.
The better rule seems to require a direct and immediate relation-
ship between the act and the maintenance of school order and
discipline.
29
The Restatement of Torts takes a novel position insofar as
punishment of pupils whose parents have expressly forbidden
the teacher to punish the child.30 It is stated therein that, under
those circumstances, the teacher's right to punish flows from the
state and, thus, can only be exercised by public school authorties.
Such a distinction seems ill-founded because the need for dis-
cipline is as great in both the public and private system. Arti-
ficial distinctions can frustrate, rather than aid, the private
school in the accomplishment of its public purpose-education.
Research has discovered only one reported decision involv-
ing a claim of false imprisonment.31 The reason for this scarcity
of authority may be that teachers "discipline" pupils, rather than
"imprison" them. The Restatement of Torts takes the position
that a teacher is privileged to impose such confinement as is
reasonably necessary to secure the observance of the necessary
discipline. 32
A caveat should be sounded with respect to requests by
police to interrogate pupils at school. The teacher may wish to
assist the police by making the pupil available, and this probably
would not expose him to liability. However, discretion would
dictate that the teacher not take part in any detention, either
verbally or by his actions.
There is also a scarcity of authority on the question of
illegal search and seizure. Certain petty thefts or "losses" are
bound to occur during school hours, and it would seem logical
to conclude that a teacher can make a reasonable investigation.
28 O'Rourke v. Walker, 102 Conn. 130, 128 Atl. 25 (1925).
29 In Pennsylvania, the teacher, by express statutory provision, has author-
ity over pupils while they are going to and from their homes. Purdon's Pa.
Stat. Ann., Tit. 24 § 13-1317.
30 Restatement, Torts § 153.
31 Fertich v. Michener, 111 Ind. 472, 11 N. E. 605 (1887).
32 Restatement, Torts § 154.
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Whether such an investigation can include the search of a pupil's
person and property is a question about which no easy answer
can be given. The two reported decisions in this area, both from
Tennessee, reach opposite results, because, as stated by the court,
the teacher in the second case told the pupil that he was search-
ing him only for the purpose of clearing him of suspicion of
theft.33
A different question is presented by a teacher's need to
search lockers and desks for sanitation purposes or to discover
"contraband." So long as the desk, lock, and locker are owned
by the school, it would seem that even a routine search would
be proper, probable cause not being a prerequisite. As an addi-
tional safeguard, the school authorities might, at the beginning
of each semester, inform the students that the school expressly
reserves the right to enter the desks and lockers.
Conclusion
A teacher, like every other member of society, should be
held accountable for his negligent torts in failing to supervise,
failing to use good judgment and failing to instruct. The teach-
er's protection lies in an individual policy of insurance or in the
enactment of legislation requiring the school board to hold him
harmless for torts committed within the scope of his employ-
ment.
34
But a teacher should not be so hamstrung by the law of in-
tentional torts, especially with respect to alleged assaults and
batteries, that it interferes with his function-to teach. One
whose most recent experience with education has been at the
university level tends to forget that serious discipline problems
exist at the lower levels. A teacher who cannot control his class
cannot teach-corporal punishment may be needed in certain
instances to enforce such control.
The sensible, immediate solution to the problem of an al-
leged assault and battery is to adopt the rule which has been
enunciated by the courts in the criminal cases: there is a battery
only when there is severe or excessive punishment plus either
malice on the part of the teacher or the production or threat of
permanent injury. Any other rule would unhappily expose the
teacher to the uncertainties of a jury verdict.
33 Marlar v. Bill, 181 Tenn. 100, 178 S. W. 2d 634 (1944); Phillips v. Johns,
12 Tenn. App. 354 (1930).
34 For example, see N. Y. Education Law § 3023.
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